1. INTRODUCTION

The JavaMail API provides a platform-independent and 
protocol-independent framework to build mail and messaging applications. 
The JavaMail API is implemented as a Java platform optional package and 
is also available as part of the Java 2 platform, Enterprise Edition.


2. SYNOPSIS

MimeBodyPart.getFileName () method in the JavaMail API doesn't properly 
validate filename attribute in Content-Disposition header, what makes it 
vulnerable to directory traversal attacks. Successful exploitation of 
this vulnerability allows writing arbitrary content in any directory 
accessible to the servlet running JavaMail.


3. AFFECTED VERSIONS

This vulnerability has been checked in current release, JavaMail 1.3.2. 
It may be present in all previous versions.


4. EXPLOITATION PROCEDURE

Send an email with the following filename attribute in 
Content-Disposition header:

../../../file.ext

This will write attachment three directories backward from expected 
location, as long as the servlet processing the email has writeable 
access to that directory.


5. EXAMPLE SCENARIO

This method uses getFileName () method to save the first attachment into 
a file:

protected void saveMailAttachment (javax.mail.internet.MimeMultipart mp) {
try {
int n = mp.getCount();
javax.mail.Part p = mp.getBodyPart (0);
String disposition = p.getDisposition ();

if (disposition != null &&
(disposition.equalsIgnoreCase (javax.mail.Part.ATTACHMENT)
|| disposition.equalsIgnoreCase (javax.mail.Part.INLINE) ) ) {

String filename = p.getFileName ();
File f = new File (filename);
OutputStream os = new BufferedOutputStream (new FileOutputStream (f) );
InputStream is = p.getInputStream ();
int c;
while ( (c = is.read () ) != -1)
os.write (c);
os.close ();
}
} catch (Exception e) { }
}


6. API DOCUMENTATION

getFileName

public java.lang.String getFileName() throws MessagingException

Get the filename associated with this part, if possible. Useful if this 
part represents an "attachment" that was loaded from a file. The 
filename will usually be a simple name, not including directory components.

Returns: Filename to associate with this part


7. VULNERABLE SOURCE CODE

The following code has been obtained by decompiling JavaMail 
MimeBodyPart class file. Although JavaMail source code is available from 
Sun’s site, checking this vulnerability over binaries is somewhat more 
reliable.

MimeBodyPart.java:

public String getFileName () throws MessagingException {
return getFileName ( ( (MimePart) (this) ) );
}

static String getFileName (MimePart mimepart) throws MessagingException {

String s = null;
String s1 = mimepart.getHeader ("Content-Disposition", null);

if (s1 != null) {
ContentDisposition contentdisposition = new ContentDisposition (s1);
s = contentdisposition.getParameter("filename");
}

if (s == null) {
String s2 = mimepart.getHeader ("Content-Type", null);
if (s2 != null)
try {
ContentType contenttype = new ContentType (s2);
s = contenttype.getParameter ("name");
} catch (ParseException _ex) { }
}

if (decodeFileName && s != null) {
try {
s = MimeUtility.decodeText(s);
} catch(UnsupportedEncodingException unsupportedencodingexception) {
throw new MessagingException
("Can't decode filename", unsupportedencodingexception);
}
}

return s;
}

Not that no check for directory traversal patterns is performed.


8. CURRENT WORKAROUND

Input validation mechanism should be enforced in the servlet being 
developed. No patches are available for this issue.


9. MORE INFORMATION

https://java.sun.com/products/javamail/

-------------------------------
Rafael San Miguel Carrasco
Security Consultant
rafael.sanmiguel@dvc.es
+ 34 660 856 647
+ 34 902 464 546
Davinci Consulting - www.dvc.es
Oficina Madrid - Parque empresarial Alvento
Via de los Poblados 1 Edificio A 6ª planta
28033 Madrid
-------------------------------